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DECENTRALISATION AND ELITE POLITICS IN PAPUA
JAAP TIMMERABSTRACT
This paper focuses on conflicts in the Province 
of Papua (former Irian Jaya) that were stimulated 
by the recent devolution of power of administrative 
functions in Indonesia. While the national 
decentralisation policy aims at accommodating 
anti-Jakarta sentiments in the regions and 
intends to stimulate development, it augments 
contentions within the Papuan elite that go hand 
in hand with ethnic and regional tensions and 
increasing demands for more sovereignty among 
communities. This paper investigates the histories 
of regional identities and Papuan elite politics 
in order to map the current political landscape 
in Papua. A brief discussion of the behaviour of 
certain Papuan political players shows that many 
of them are enthused by an environment that 
is no longer defined singly by centralised state 
control but increasingly by regional opportunities 
to control state resources and to make profitable 
deals with national and international commercial 
ventures. As a result, the aspirations of legislators 
are all too often detached from the reasons for 
demands for more sovereignty cherished among 
the majority of Papuans whose frustrations about 
ineffective governance are ever increasing. More 
generally, the conflict in Papua only partly follows 
prevailing opinion about the tensions between 
‘Papua’ and ‘Jakarta’ or ‘Indonesia’.
INTRODUCTION
For a number of reasons ranging from Dutch 
nationalism, geopolitical considerations, and self-
righteous moral convictions, the Netherlands 
Government refused to include West New 
Guinea in the negotiations for the independence 
of Indonesia in the late 1940s (Lijphart 1966; 
Huydecoper van Nigtevecht 1990; Penders 2002: 
Chapter 2; and Vlasblom 2004: Chapter 3). At the 
same time, the government in Netherlands New 
Guinea initiated economic and infrastructure 
development as well as political emancipation of 
the Papuans under paternalistic guardianship. In 
the course of the 1950s, when tensions between 
the Netherlands and Indonesia grew over the 
status of West New Guinea, the Dutch began to 
guide a limited group of educated Papuans towards 
independence culminating in the establishment 
of the New Guinea Council (Nieuw-Guinea Raad) 
in 1961. In addition, a flag, the Bintang Kejora 
or Morning Star flag, was designed to be flown 
beside the Dutch flag and a national anthem was 
adopted to be played and sung during official 
occasions after the Netherlands national hymn.
After a twelve-year dispute that was reaching 
its peak with the threat of open military conflict, 
this policy had to be aborted. In December 1961, 
President Sukarno issued the Trikora (Tri Komando 
Rakyat or ‘People’s Threefold Command’) for the 
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liberation of Irian Barat (West Irian). At the 
heart of this massive mobilisation was Operasi 
Mandala, an Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia (ABRI) campaign designed to put 
pressure on the Netherlands government. The 
United States and Australia were not willing to 
support the Dutch military forces.
In an international climate of decolonisation, 
and after President Sukarno’s sustained pressing 
of Indonesia’s claim to the territory, the United 
States sponsored negotiations between Indonesia 
and the Netherlands about the future of West 
New Guinea under the auspices of the United 
Nations. The resulting New York Agreement of 15 
August 1962 outlined the transfer of Netherlands 
sovereignty over West New Guinea to an interim 
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority 
(UNTEA) from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, 
to be followed by a second phase during which 
the intervening administration would hand over 
full administrative responsibility to Indonesia. 
The agreement formulated the provision that the 
people of Irian Barat would exercise free choice 
over their future relationship with Indonesia 
before the end of 1969. 
The victory over what had now become the 
Province of Irian Barat was a boost to Indonesian 
nationalism and became portrayed as the final 
chapter of decolonisation.1 The Indonesians, 
ruling the new province under the banner of 
the Trikora mobilisation, were triumphant while 
elements of the Papuan elite empowered by 
the Dutch began to complain about what they 
saw as a blunt Indonesian takeover. Feelings of 
being marginalized by Indonesian bureaucrats 
and immigrants from other Indonesian islands 
filling jobs and business opportunities arose 
mainly among urban Papuans. Some of the 
educated Papuan elite were arrested or sidelined 
as ‘collaborators with the Dutch’ while others 
continued to play a role in the administration. 
A plebiscite called Pepera (Penentuan 
Pendapat Rakyat or ‘Act of Free Choice’) was 
held in July-August 1969 during which 1020 
cautiously chosen representatives from eight 
regions voted overwhelmingly for integration 
with Indonesia.2 Protest was heard, dissonant 
speeches delivered, desperate cries in the form 
of written notes were delivered to the United 
Nations observers, and demonstrations in 
Sukarnopura (former Hollandia, now Jayapura), 
Biak and Manokwari were dispersed swiftly by 
the Indonesian military. Over the following 
decades, faith in self-determination as linked to 
the undemocratic implementation of the Pepera 
became a key ingredient in a variety of Papuan 
nationalisms. 
In response to the ‘Indonesian occupation’ 
of their land a liberation organisation called the 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua 
Organisation) emerged as a local movement in 
Manokwari in the 1960s and, from there, spread 
over the Kepala Burung (Bird’s Head region). It 
soon became a fragmented network of dispersed 
groups of guerrilla-fighters.3 Its access to weapons 
was limited and popular support scant. Very few 
elite Papuans joined the armed struggle and the 
vast majority of people living outside the urban 
centres did not feel the sense of belonging to 
a nation that had been invaded by Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, disillusion with the Indonesian 
government began to grow widely among those 
who had enjoyed the fruits of the accelerated 
development effort of the Dutch government 
since the 1950s.
President Suharto’s New Order regime (1966-
1998) put much effort into developing the province 
and it received more funds than all other regions of 
Indonesia. But the implementation of largely top-
down development programs often failed. At the 
same time, an ever-growing but relatively poorly 
funded military (TNI), supporting a network of 
alliances for both political control and predator 
business, has lead to the dislocation of Papuans. 
On top of that, Butonese, Buginese, Makassarese 
and Javanese immigrants began to fill manual 
labour and seize small business opportunities. 
As a result, frustration about limited access to 
opportunities in modern Indonesia intensified 
tensions between ‘Papuans’ and ‘Indonesians’, in 
particular those who arrived in Papua through 
so-called transmigration programs or the larger 
waves of spontaneous migration.4 Furthermore, 
in terms of governance, the region is amongst 
the most poorly developed in Indonesia, while 
economic and ethnic differences play a significant 
and sometimes alarming role in land and resource 
politics (Timmer forthcoming).
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and 
the presidency being handed over to his Deputy 
President, B.J. Habibie, a spirit of ‘democratic 
reform’ (reformasi) swept across the archipelago. 
In Papua it lead to what has been duly called a 
‘Papuan Spring’ during which Papuan leaders 
from all over the region carefully sought to 
balance representations from the coast and the 
highlands in a wave of national Papuan actions 
and the establishment of Papuan organisations 
(see Van den Broek and Szalay 2001). At massive 
gatherings all over the region during which 
heated debates over the history of Papua and its 
possible future (‘autonomy’ or ‘independence’) 
were held, the Papuan Spring “took the form 
of the indigenous Papuan people demanding 
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163, my translation). The merdeka-leader there 
was Marthen Indey, who was raised in Ambon, 
Maluku, and had been posted to Banda Neira, 
where he became inspired by the prominent 
nationalist, Mohammed Hatta, who was exiled 
there. In 1946, Indey joined the Komite Indonesia 
Merdeka (KMI, ‘Indonesia Freedom Committee’) 
led by the Manadonese government medical 
doctor, Ms Gerungan. KMI advocated the 
independence of Indonesia, including West New 
Guinea through all legal means (Vlasblom 2004: 
164). 
As Chauvel concludes, the nationalism of 
this period had a narrow base and the nationalists 
‘were culturally isolated from the great mass of 
Papuans’ (2005: 6). The majority of Papuans had 
very little knowledge of Indonesia and its merdeka 
struggles. After the incorporation of West New 
Guinea into Indonesia, people throughout Papua 
began to learn about merdeka as one of the chief 
dictums of the New Order government. At 
the same time, growing resentment due to the 
failure of development promises to crystallise and 
unrelenting military operations grew and merdeka 
began to take on meanings that were part of a 
struggle to secure freedom against a tyrannical 
state. 
While the OPM and a number of Papuans 
in exile tried to keep the ideal of merdeka alive 
for most Papuans it became a principle that is 
suggested to be in the hearts of all Papuans. 
When asked bluntly about ‘OPM’, Imyan people 
of the southwestern Kepala Burung, while having 
no clear ideas about its organisational structure 
and strategies, tend to suggest that the OPM will 
eventually complete the struggle for merdeka. 
Further scrutiny of their worldviews, however, 
reveals that many take the view that Jesus Christ 
will perform the role of bringing merdeka. He will 
bring wealth and prosperity to their community 
(not ‘Papua’) and He will re-establish the just, 
original order in the world. Imyan refer to this 
order in terms of Toror or Baimla, a mythological 
world during which the Imyan were at the centre 
of the world and possessed all the knowledge and 
power (Timmer 1998, 2000a, and 2000b: 302; cf. 
Rutherford 2005 and Golden 2003).
Taking into account the immense variety 
of cultural traditions in Papua, it should be 
no surprise that peoples’ ideas about merdeka 
are diverse. Moreover, there are also divisions 
within Papuan communities. Imyan villagers, 
for example, tend to divide into two groups: 
one that is inclined to withdraw into autonomy 
(related to ideas about a past community of male 
initiates retreating in the forest to engage with 
powerful sky beings), and another that seeks 
merdeka, or independence, from Indonesia” 
(Sumule 2003b: 353; Chauvel 2005: 11-20). 
Before I discuss the Papuan Spring it is necessary 
to briefly elaborate on what kinds of meanings 
merdeka has assumed in the history of Papua.
MERDEKA AND MEMORIA PASSIONIS
The Indonesian nationalist revolutionary 
understanding of ‘merdeka’ dates back to the 
mid-1920s growth of the nationalist movement 
followed, after promises during the Japanese 
occupation, by the Indonesian revolution of 
1945-1949. During the late 1940s, ‘merdeka 
became the battle-cry with which the citizenry 
was summoned to support the cause, the salute 
with which revolutionaries would greet each 
other, the cry of solidarity at every mass rally, 
and the signature at the end of every Republican 
document’ (Reid 1998: 155). As Reid (1998: 156) 
points out, merdeka meant national independence 
to the revolutionaries but the people experienced 
it as a far more immediate and personal freedom. 
Later, during Soeharto’s New Order government, 
merdeka became part of the military ideologies 
and plainly came to mean ‘the independence’ 
that was proclaimed on 17 August 1945 and 
ritually celebrated every year since.
In Papua, primarily urban educated 
Papuans began to absorb the idea of merdeka 
as national independence since the late 1950s, 
when President Sukarno became determined to 
incorporate Netherlands New Guinea to complete 
the nationalist struggle and resistance amid the 
Papuan elite against the Dutch government grew 
(Grootenhuis 1961). Before that period, only a 
limited number of educated and politically active 
Papuans cherished ideas about merdeka. For 
example, in Serui on Yapen Island, Silas Papare 
established the Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(‘Indonesian Freedom Party’) in 1946, of which 
members read sections of Republican papers in 
village churches on the island, while outside the 
churches people exercised the exclamation of 
“merdeka”. Papare was a charismatic leader and 
the pro-Indonesian movement on Yapen was 
seriously crippled when he left for Indonesia in 
1949 (Vlasblom 2004: 162; Chauvel 2005: 71). 
Around the same time, also as part of a struggle 
against the Dutch government, Lukas Rumkorem, 
a Biak assistant patrol officer, established the 
Partai Indonesia Merdeka on the island of Biak 
(Vlasblom 2004: 163). In Hollandia as well, 
“enthusiasm for ‘red and white’ [the colours 
of the Indonesian national flag] got hold of a 
number of schooled Papuans” (Vlasblom 2004: 
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to benefit from unique opportunities offered by 
‘Indonesia’ by engaging with the government 
and its promises of development. What the 
two divisions share is a versatile but persistent 
concern with effective knowledge that they 
believe is held among foreigners and considered 
indispensable for bringing about change that 
Imyan people themselves can control. These 
beliefs are expressed in terms of a felt need for 
relative autonomy from state control when the 
government’s administrative grid discords with 
local realities and people’s aspirations (Timmer 
2004b: 121-124; cf. Maclean 1994).
This concern is in fact a crucial part of a larger 
and still more intrusive concern with denied 
identity and lost certainties. As indicated above, 
in stories about the millennium, Imyan relate this 
concern to ancient topographies that characterize 
the essence of their past lives (Timmer 2004b: 
130). The Imyan share this concern with most 
other Papuan communities and it can be said that 
a possibly shared merdeka-aspiration in Papua is 
thus, in general terms, about deferential treatment 
as human beings, and in principal irrespective 
of the political or national context. In these 
ontological ideas about sovereignty and dignity 
(harga diri), merdeka is thus chiefly a response to 
decades-long denial of the people’s competence 
in learning and performing in modern colonial 
and postcolonial contexts. This partly explains 
the unrelenting search for understanding of the 
suffering of the Papuans, preferably through a 
democratic dialogue with ‘Jakarta’ that was so 
effectively expressed during the Papuan Spring. 
But the idea of having one’s own state, right 
now and for all times, is seldom on the minds 
of most Papuans, as it is a construct far from the 
more intrusive largely individual and communal 
concern with sovereignty and harga diri. 
During the Papuan Spring (1999-2000), 
merdeka took on the harga diri-meaning when 
throughout the territory numerous raisings of 
the Bintang Kejora flag (which was prohibited 
until 1998) and concurrent praying sessions were 
organised.5 The Papuan Spring was a period 
during which President Abdurrachman Wahid 
allowed the Papuans to name their province 
Papua and to raise their national flag alongside the 
Indonesian flag. Hundreds of prominent leaders 
from all over Papua found the space to organise a 
broadly supported front. They developed political 
strategies during two large gatherings: MUBES 
(Musyawarah Besar or ‘Grand Gathering for 
Discussion’) in February 2000, and the Papuan 
Congress (Kongres Papua) in May-June 2000 (see 
Alua 2002a, 2002b). These gatherings proceeded 
undisturbed and while the political agenda 
demanded independence of Papua, the strategies 
developed favoured a dialogue with Jakarta short 
of violence. The focus was on the suffering of 
the Papuans and numerous discussions revolved 
around human rights. ‘HAM’ (Hak Asazi 
Manusia, Human Rights) became a widely used 
term taking on a variety of meanings in different 
contexts but generally referred to lack of respect 
for the Papuans.
Expressions of independence for Papua were 
articulated by the Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan 
Presidium Council) that was established during 
the MUBES. Under the combined highland-
coastal leadership of Thom Beanal and Theys 
Eluay, the Presidium formulated Papua-wide 
supported resolutions that were adopted during 
the Kongres. The resolutions include the claim 
that Papua had in fact become independent 
with the establishment of the New Guinea 
Council in 1961 and rejected the New York 
Agreement because Papuans did not take part in 
the negotiations. In addition, the resolution states 
that the Act of Free Choice was not conducted 
properly (Alua 2002b: 96). More widely shared 
was the opinion that ‘the land of the Papuans’ 
had become the plaything of international and 
capitalist forces and that its people had become 
marginalised in Indonesian society. 
Underlying a strong wish for increased 
sovereignty with predominant millenarian 
characteristics, the sudden rise of Papuan 
nationalisms at all levels of society also called into 
question any extent to which Papuans had become 
Indonesians. The differences between ‘Papuans’ 
and ‘Indonesians’ were, however, only rarely 
expressed. Both the symbolic and explicit messages 
broadcast during gatherings, manifestations, prayer 
sessions and flag raisings, emphasized the living 
memory of distress that in human rights activist 
circles in Papua is typified as memoria passionis 
(or in Indonesian: ingatan penderitaan).6 Memoria 
passionis refers to the memory of trauma due 
to general social and economic marginalisation, 
frequent denial of dignity, and sometimes, outright 
terror. Events during the Papuan Spring clearly 
indicated that the memoria passionis could be 
ignored only at peril. Since the dawn of this 
period memoria passionis began to be expressed as a 
shared Papuan history of suffering and was flung in 
the face of ‘Jakarta’ when a team of one-hundred 
leaders (Tim 100) from all over Papua presented 
a clear demand for independence to President 
Habibie on 26 February 1999. Next, a fact-finding 
team of the Indonesian House of Representatives 
was sent to Irian Jaya in July 1998, leading to a 
wave of enthusiasm among virtually all sections of 
society about a dialogue. 
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The dialogue was expected to lead to at least 
formal apologies for human rights violations, 
end impunity for the armed forces, and increase 
respect for the harga diri of the Papuans. At the 
same time, it also unleashed often very political 
expressions epitomised in such as expressions as 
OFM (resonating with OPM) meaning: Otonomi 
– Federasi – Merdeka, indicating people’s hope that 
discussion about increased autonomy for Irian Jaya 
would lead to the establishment of a Federal State 
of Indonesia which would eventually culminate 
in independence for West Papua. What followed 
in reality, however, was an overall well-intended 
Papuan response to President Habibie’s offer to 
contemplate on independence aspirations and, 
within the term of reference, establish a dialogue 
between ‘Jakarta’ and ‘Papua’.
The dialogue was continued during 
Aburrachman Wahid’s presidency but a ban on 
flag raisings and a number of bloody military 
attacks on protesters discouraged most Papuan 
leaders from continuing to seek understanding 
of the situation in Papua amid policy makers 
in Jakarta. The Presidium was labelled illegal 
and the detention of its leaders on charges of 
treason and subversion, and the brutal murder of 
the chair of the Presidium, Theys Hiyo Eluay, in 
2000 marked the end of the Papuan Spring. The 
killing of Eluay was orchestrated by Kopassus 
(TNI Special Forces). The counterinsurgency 
practised by the TNI began to form a major 
threat to most attempts to organise people to 
defend their rights and to continue pressing 
Jakarta to seek solutions to past and present 
injustice and feelings of disenchantment. By 
the close of 2000, ‘the developing atmosphere 
of a ‘Papuan Spring’ … had been replaced by 
widespread fear, silence, and renewed anger’ 
(Van den Broek and Szalay 2001: 91; see figure 
1). At the same time, people began to distrust 
the remnants of the Presidium and its regional 
branches because of rumours about the Presidium 
accepting money from big companies in Papua 
and frustration about its leaders travelling abroad 
all the time while neglecting the issues faced by 
local communities. 
SPECIAL AUTONOMY AND NEW 
BLOSSOMS 
Among the most promising developments 
in this reformasi period was the granting of a so-
called Special Autonomy (commonly referred to 
as Otsus, from Otonomi Khusus) for the province 
of Papua in early 2001. Otsus matches an earlier 
law for the province of Aceh but was drafted 
by people in Papua and establishes provisions 
that surpass the autonomy conditions for other 
provinces. Otsus envisions enhanced autonomy 
for Papuan communities and their institutions, as 
well as a greater share of revenues from resource 
extraction projects in Papua, including 70 percent 
of the oil and gas industry and 80 percent from 
mining ventures. On top of that, Otsus entails 
special funds for the improvement of health 
services, education facilities, and infrastructure 
Figure 1. Drawing made by someone in Biak on 3 December 2001. It reflects the fear of the military 
(TNI) during the negotiations for more autonomy (Otonomi) for Papua, the passive role of the United 
Nations and the sidelining of the Papuans. Two and a half years earlier soldiers opened fire at a group 
of some two hundred demonstrators who had raised the Bintang Kejora flag in the harbour of Biak (see 
Rutherford 1999: 39-40).
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that benefit rural communities for a period of 
twenty years (see Sumule 2003c). 
Otsus was a Papuan political choice that 
indicated a willingness to cooperate with the 
central government. It was envisioned as a 
necessary step towards justice for the neglected 
people of Papua (Maniagasi 2001; Sumule 2003a, 
2003b). A technical assistance team comprising 
intellectuals from Papua, whom the Governor of 
Papua, Jaap Solossa, had appointed, drafted the 
bill in early 2001. After extensive lobbying by 
the team and a number of influential Papuans, 
it was accepted as Law No. 21/2001, to be 
implemented as of 2002.7 This initially positive 
answer from Jakarta was one of an insecure 
central government after the 1999 ballot in East 
Timor during which a majority voted against 
autonomy within Indonesia. 
Apart from a few hard-line voices 
demanding merdeka, people in Papua expected 
positive developments from Otsus. But public 
interest in Otsus dwindled when people saw 
that implementation of Otsus was slow due to 
the lack of capacity of legislators and that the 
establishment of the Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP) 
or Papuan People’s Assembly did not receive 
support from Jakarta. The MRP is an essential 
element of Otsus as it envisions the protection of 
the rights of Papuans. It would assemble people 
from customary groups, religious institutions 
and women’s groups and grant them extensive 
political powers. The Ministry of Home Affairs 
delayed the establishment of the MRP because 
elements in Jakarta saw that the powers it 
granted to Papuans could endanger stability 
in Papua. The Minister of Home Affairs, Hari 
Sabarno, insisted that the MRP should only 
represent Papuan cultural values (Chauvel and 
Bhakti 2004: 38). In the mean time, people in 
Papua began to question whether Otsus was 
yet another hollow promise made by ‘Jakarta’. 
Others remained hopeful that with the assistance 
of, and pressure from, foreign governments and 
international NGOs, Jakarta would eventually 
grant the MRP to Papua. 
These hopes basically faced a dead end after 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri promulgated 
a decree on 27 January 2003 on the expedition 
of the implementation of Law No. 45/1999 
regarding the creation of two new provinces 
(West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya), three 
new regencies (Paniai, Mimika, and Puncak Jaya), 
and one municipality (Sorong). The envisioned 
plan behind the decree is labelled pemekaran 
(‘blossoming’ or administrative fragmentation). 
While the division of Papua was also part of the 
Otsus Law, the procedure it outlined was that it 
could only be implemented after deliberation of 
the MRP and upon approval of the provincial 
parliament (Sullivan 2003). 
Then Deputy Governor, John Djopari, 
stressed that the idea of pemekaran was not new 
but that it had been proposed in 1999 by the 
then Governor, Freddy Numberi, and his three 
Deputy Governors: Djopari, Herman Monim, and 
Abraham Atururi (ICG 2003: 3).8 Soon it became 
clear that Monim and Atururi were frustrated 
because they were promised governorship for 
the new provinces but that never materialised. 
Djopari later became Indonesian ambassador to 
Papua New Guinea and Monim retired. Atururi, 
however, was still interested in the establishment 
of a new province. 
In contrast to Otsus, the pemekaran decree was 
issued without consultation with the provincial 
government. Local communities or leaders of 
religious and other civil society organisations 
in Papua were also not involved in the decision 
making process. While Otsus had been poorly 
socialised among the people it met with support 
because it came from people whose dialogue with 
Jakarta intended to benefit the development of 
Papua. Supporters of Otsus saw the presidential 
decree as a sign that the political climate in 
Indonesia was reverting to a New Order-style 
government. Many began to speculate that it 
was an attempt by Jakarta to ‘divide and rule’ 
the Papuans. Distress in Papua grew when people 
learned that the initiative for the policy had come 
from disgruntled elements in the Papuan elite in 
cooperation with policy makers in the central 
government - the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
the National Intelligence Board (BIN, Badan 
Intelijen Negara) (McGibbon 2004: 55). 
The International Crisis Group (2003: 8-9) 
points out that BIN involvement in the revival 
of pemekaran may have commenced with the 
lobbying by Jimmy Ijie, a Papuan from the 
Sorong region. Ijie heads the so-called Irian Jaya 
Crisis Centre (IJCC) in Jakarta and, in that 
capacity, sent a letter to BIN urging that Law 
No. 45 be implemented immediately. He argues 
that an administratively undivided Papua would 
foster Papuan nationalism (ibid: 8).9 In late 2002, 
Ijie formed a team called Tim 315 consisting of 
people from the Sorong and Manokwari regions 
and a number of Papuan students residing in 
Yogyakarta and Jakarta to support Atururi to 
negotiate the plan with BIN and the Ministry 
of Home Affairs. Apparently, a large amount of 
money (approximately U$320,000) was involved 
and a number of financial rewards were promised 
to officers in the Ministry of Home Affairs and to 
Ijie’s IJCC.10 
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in Papua mainly in terms of violations of human 
rights by ‘Jakarta’, which are opposed by ‘Papuan 
resistance’. This resistance is often depicted as 
a single actor with a uniform ethnic identity 
driven by a uniting national consciousness. 
Papuan identity is then presupposed to exist in 
a bounded cultural and racial sphere defined as 
‘Melanesia’ as opposed to ‘Indonesia’ or ‘Asia’.11 
This is hardly conceivable considering the vast 
variety of cultural backgrounds and centuries-
old histories of connections between Papua and 
the Moluccas (see below). Only a few recent 
anthropological and historical studies of Papuan 
communities relate to these histories and include 
discussions about the integration of Papuans into 
Indonesia and its concomitant internal tensions 
(Oosterhout 2000; Rutherford 2003; Stasch 2001 
and 2003; Timmer 2000a, 2000b, and 2003).12 
Rutherford, for instance, points out that the 
high degree of integration of the Biak-Numfor 
region into Indonesia illuminates ‘a sociocultural 
economy that stands cheek by jowl with the 
discourses of Papuan separatism and Indonesian 
nationalism, yet radically undercuts them both’ 
(2003: 4). 
The lack of attention to the variety 
of and changes in Papuan worldviews since 
decolonisation is astonishing as newly emerging 
identities and related concerns and strategies lead 
to tensions in and between local communities 
and shape to a large extent the politics of the 
elite. In the virtual absence of a middle-class 
and very limited private investment in human 
development and the delivery of services, the 
powerful elites in Papua are to be found in the 
administrative sector and in religious institutions. 
Therefore, Papuan political power is in the hands 
of these new bureaucratic and religious elites. 
Christian and Muslim leaders in Papua 
recognise that religion is an important source 
of inspiration for the people and that religious 
institutions, being the largest and most organised 
civil society organisations in Papua, should play 
an important role as mediators between the 
government and communities (see Giay 2001). 
In this paper, I focus on certain members of 
the bureaucratic elite as influential actors in 
determining the future of the region. In particular 
I discuss one of the most striking aspects of the 
present-day politics of this elite in Papua, that 
is, the ways in which leaders gain popular and 
central government support and play out regional 
differences in power politics related to the wave 
of recently established provinces and districts. 
The varied ethnic and political landscape in 
Papua is accentuated by the timing and nature of 
contact with outside powers. In pre-colonial times, 
Another possible motive for the partitioning 
of Papua is that the creation of new provinces 
and districts will increase the number of troops 
in the territory. Each separate province may get 
its own Military Resort Command (Korem), with 
its own network of District Military Commands 
(Kodim). A potentially stronger military presence 
aroused suspicion, as it may not only increase 
repression but also facilitate connections with 
local businesses with which the army is involved. 
As a result, much of the goodwill that was created 
among Papuans during the dawn of reformasi 
turned to disappointment. At the same time, 
the awareness that elements of the Papuan elite 
were involved in the pemekaran policy nourished 
already widespread distrust of those Papuans who 
were making careers in the formal sector or the 
armed forces, ‘infecting them with the Indonesia 
virus’, as the popular expression runs. This virus 
of Indonesia refers to untrustworthy behaviour 
of Papuan legislators that is also captured under 
another popular expression, KKN or Korupsi, 
Kolusi, Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism), which dates back to the New Order 
period. Swiftly, the previous expression ‘OFM’ 
developed into ‘OPM’, now referring to a new 
sequence: autonomy (Otonomi), Pemekaran, and 
eventually independence (Merdeka).
Ideally, the devolution of power entailed 
in the pemekaran policy should be a promising 
move as it can enhance good governance at the 
local level. This obviously requires an increase in 
administrative capacities, development planning 
and program management. Currently, government 
officials in the region are inclined to acknowledge 
local demands to become tuan di atas tanahnya 
(‘the ruler of one’s own country’) but they also 
tend to be hungry for power after decades of 
curtailing bonds to the centre. Elite politics and 
the responses among local people largely revolve 
around these issues. Decentralisation leads to 
a diversification of political concerns that are 
connected with local identities, which in turn 
tend to become more extreme. 
PAPUANISATION AND ADAPTATION
Present-day conflicts in Papua include disputes 
over natural resources and economic and political 
power struggles, and frictions between peoples 
of different ethnicities, religions, and between 
immigrants and locals (ICG 2002; Amnesty 
International 2002). Studies of ‘the conflict in 
Papua’, however, commonly focus on Jakarta 
policies and armed forces operations. Most reports 
produced by Papua watchers portray developments 
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contact with regional others and internal and 
in-migration were perhaps the most significant 
factors in demographic, social and cultural 
change in Papua. Papuan communities have 
always been very mobile and today people are on 
the move due to urbanisation, village formation, 
displacement, job migration, resettlement, and so 
on. More generally, many coastal groups looked 
for centuries towards the east. In particular the 
coastal communities of the Kepala Burung and 
the Cenderawasih Bay maintained trade and 
marriage relationships with the Moluccas and 
Islam spread along certain coastal stretches.13 In 
contrast, people in the highland regions lived 
relatively isolated in mountain valleys with little 
direct but extensive indirect trade networks 
extending to the coast (Ploeg 2001). 
Cultural differences between the mountains 
and the north and the west coast changed markedly 
with the advent of Christian missionisation and 
Dutch administration during the 20th Century. 
Mission activity, followed hesitantly by the 
government, affected the Cenderawasih Bay, 
the Kepala Burung, the north coast and coastal 
stretches such as Mimika and Merauke along 
the southwest coast, while most groups in the 
highlands and communities in the southern 
plains remained ‘untouched’ until the 1960s. 
Encounters between highland people and the 
state and church intensified after the Indonesian 
government took over the territory from 1963 
(see Ploeg 2001; Hays 1993). 
Shortly before and after the Second World 
War, economic development was limited, while 
at later stages new political developments took 
place. The rapid expansion of administration 
and education had a major impact on the coastal 
people in Biak, Manokwari, Yapen en Sentani, 
and to a lesser extent in the Kepala Burung and 
Fak-fak. Papuans from these regions absorbed 
Dutch teachings at high schools in Netherlands 
New Guinea and were exposed to European life 
styles, while some were given the opportunity to 
enjoy education in Europe and the Pacific. The 
figures have remained modest since the early 
1960s, with only about ten thousand Papuans 
(of a total population estimated at around one 
million) in government service, while a smaller 
number were employed in the private sector 
(Report on Netherlands New Guinea 1961; 
Groenewegen and Van de Kaa 1964; Timmer 
forthcoming). 
Later generations grew up in the context of 
the Indonesian nation-state, undertook studies at 
Indonesian institutions and made careers in the 
Indonesian civil service, equipping themselves 
with the skills and language of modern Indonesia. 
Whereas many members of the old Papuan elite 
created by the Dutch were marginalized, the new 
generations of educated Papuans (still largely from 
coastal regions) found their way into the civil 
service. Participation of Papuans in administration 
and commercial ventures was however still 
restricted. The Indonesian government was afraid 
that Papuans would gain too much of a voice in 
the administrative sector while banking facilities 
are few and tend to privilege Javanese, Buginese, 
Moluccan and foreign investors. Moreover, the 
commercial infrastructure is poorly developed 
and bureaucratic approvals for trade are painfully 
slow, in particular for Papuans. 
It was only in the late 1990s that sincere 
efforts were made to Papuanise the formal sector. 
Today, around 35 percent of the labour force 
in the government is Papuan, which is a poor 
reflection of the demographic reality in which 
approximately 60 percent of the population 
is Papuan.14 Nevertheless, over the last few 
years more Papuans have become legislators 
both at the district and provincial levels. Amid 
many people from elsewhere in Indonesia, the 
provincial bureaucracy is chiefly dominated by 
coastal Papuans from the Cenderawasih Bay 
islands of Biak and Yapen, Sentani, and, more 
recently from the Sorong and Ayamaru regions 
of the Kepala Burung. Widjojo (1998:3) signalled 
in this respect that the biggest problem facing 
Irian Jaya was social and cultural polarisation 
and domination of the formal sector by ethnic 
Biak, Ayamaru, Serui and Sentani. In contrast 
to the provincial bureaucracy, in the district 
governments in the highlands and south coastal 
regions, the local population is more strongly 
represented, notwithstanding the presence of a 
significant number of decision makers from Biak 
and Yapen in the Cenderawasih Bay, the Sorong 
region of the Kepala Burung, and a few Javanese 
and Moluccans. 
Particularly among the recently ascending 
Sorong and Ayamaru elites, there is a remarkable 
acquaintance with Indonesian ways of doing 
politics. The acquired skills and knowledge of the 
present-day bureaucratic elite enables a number 
of influential people to establish links with 
Jakarta, which primarily serves their own benefit. 
Highlanders and people from the south-coastal 
regions (Mimika, Merauke) are often consumed 
with envy about the power enjoyed by people 
from the Kepala Burung and the Cenderawasih 
Bay. Underlying this foremost regional cleavage 
in Papua is the serious lag in development 
of most regions of the highlands.15 Moreover, 
because of isolation and due to ongoing, often 
poorly orchestrated, TNI action, the highland 
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region is currently the chief nursery of Papuan 
resistance to the Indonesian government. This 
Papuan resistance also translates into regional 
tensions as highlanders regularly challenge both 
the provincial government and coastal Papuans 
from Biak, Sorong and Sentani, where they are at 
times accused of collaboration with ‘Indonesia’. 
This tension highlights one of the main divisions 
within the Papuan nationalist movement, 
which is illustrated by Rutherford (2003: xviii), 
recounting a joke in which a highlander tells 
another that when Papua gains independence 
all Biaks will become foreigners (amberi) while 
highlanders will become Biaks. 
As mentioned earlier, during the massive 
gatherings during the Papuan Spring, Papuan 
leaders managed to balance representations 
from the highlands and the coast and Papuans 
felt united in their memoria passionis. With the 
advent of pemekaran, the tensions between elites 
from Biak, Yapen, Ayamaru and Sorong as well as 
between ‘the coast’ and ‘the highlands’ intensified. 
A recent Indonesia briefing by the International 
Crisis Group outlines that the new pemekaran 
policy, alongside a certain level of support for 
Otsus, ‘has generated intense acrimony within 
the governing elite in Papua between those who 
stand to gain from the division … and those who 
benefit more from the status quo’ (ICG 2003: 1). 
Chauvel notes that ‘[t]he jockeying for position 
that this policy unleashed suggests that regional 
and tribal interests remain politically salient’ 
(2005: xi).
THE PROTAGONISTS
As indicated above, the pemekaran option 
was supported if not stimulated by a number 
of Papuan delegates who met with President 
Megawati, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and 
BIN throughout 2002. In particular, malcontent 
Papuan political elements were mobilized by 
the above-mentioned Ijie, and Marine Brigadier 
General (retired) Abraham Atururi, who had lost 
against the current Governor, Jaap Solossa, during 
the election campaign for governorship in 1999 
(ICG 2003: 8-9). Atururi had enjoyed Dutch 
boarding school at primary level in Serui, Yapen 
during the heyday of Dutch efforts to develop 
Netherlands New Guinea. He is still in touch 
with most of his schoolmates from that time and 
is able to mobilise their support for his political 
aspirations, which indicates the importance of 
the social networks built during education. After 
the Dutch left New Guinea, Atururi attended 
the Navy National Academy after he finished 
Senior High School in Biak. He made a career in 
the navy and became a Lieutenant Colonel and 
member of intelligence agency (BAKIN – Badan 
Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, currently BIN). He 
also served in the Paspanpres or the ‘Security 
Guard for the President’. While still a Lieutenant 
Colonel, he was assigned as head of the Sorong 
District in 1992. After one five-year term in 
Sorong, he went to Jayapura to become one of the 
three Deputy Governors under Freddy Numberi. 
His term as Deputy Governor allowed him to rise 
in the military ranks and he earned his first star. 
During the reformasi period, and marking the 
end of the military’s New Order dwifungsi (‘dual 
function’ of the military conflating national 
defence with nation building), General Wiranto, 
the then Chief of the Armed Forces, demanded 
all active military personnel who were occupying 
civilian positions to choose whether they wanted 
to continue in the army or pursue a career 
as legislators. Atururi chose the latter as he 
aspired to become Governor of Irian Jaya but, as 
indicated, in 1999 he lost to Jaap Solossa. 
Like Atururi, Solossa enjoyed Dutch 
education at primary and secondary level in 
Teminabuan and Manokwari respectively, and 
then Junior High School in Sorong. After the 
transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia, 
he continued his education at Senior High 
School-level in Manokwari before studying Civil 
Administration at Universitas Cenderawasih in 
Jayapura for his undergraduate degree. Later, 
when he served as a member of the National 
Parliament, he used his spare time to pursue a 
Master Degree in Development Economics at 
Universitas Gajah Mada. He continued this 
specialisation at postgraduate level at Universitas 
Padjadjaran in Bandung with research on Special 
Autonomy for Papua. In May 2005 he received 
his doctorate. Dr Solossa has a large circle of 
acquaintances, especially from the Ayamaru and 
Sorong elites, who became unhappy with Atururi 
during his term as District Head in Sorong. In a 
similar vein, Atururi is currently supported by 
elements of the Kepala Burung elite who are not 
happy with the current District Head, John Piet 
Wanane, who is from the Ayamaru region. 
Despite growing controversy over the status of 
the province, the Minister of Home Affairs, Hari 
Sabarno, inaugurated Atururi as the Governor 
of West Irian Jaya in November 2003, leading 
to a barrage of regional criticism. The Speaker 
of the Papua provincial legislature and supporter 
of Solossa, John Ibo, said that the inauguration 
contradicted a recommendation issued by the 
People’s Consultative Assembly during its latest 
annual session and urged Jakarta to revise the law 
on the division of Papua. 
  Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua
10
Atururi arrived in Manokwari in February 2003 
to start work on the establishment of the new 
provincial headquarters. On his way from Jakarta 
he stopped in Jayapura to present to Speaker 
Ibo an official BIN statement signed by its head, 
Lieutenant General (retired) Hendropriyono, 
saying that Atururi had the authority to establish 
West Irian Jaya (Timmer 2004a: 411). Exactly a 
year later, the Constitutional Court ruled against 
a lawsuit from a Special Autonomy Defence 
Team that sought to undo the division of Papua. 
Supported by Governor Solossa and elements of 
the Papuan elite in Jayapura, the Defence Team 
had argued that the establishment of the new 
province served the interests of the Megawati 
Sukarnoputri-led Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P) which intended to weaken the 
dominant Golkar Party in the region through the 
pemekaran plan. The Team suggested that the PDI-
P had economic interests in the Bintuni Bay where 
British Petroleum is establishing the Tangguh 
liquefied natural gas plant (ICG 2003: 9). The 
Team added that both the TNI and BIN had also a 
lot to gain with the province as the two institutions 
have economic interests in maintaining a high 
level of TNI presence in the region. 
The Constitutional Court concluded that 
the establishment of West Irian Jaya remained 
valid although Law No. 45/1999 was no longer 
effective. Eight of the nine judges argued that 
the Otsus Law took effect after the new province 
and regencies were designed and that the law had 
annulled no state institution. The court ruling 
was seen as a victory for Atururi and left many 
in Jayapura, Sorong and elsewhere in Papua 
confused. While the media reported the decision 
as a win-win solution for all conflicting parties 
in Papua and Jakarta, John Ibo noted that it 
will lead to increasing disorder and growing loss 
of confidence in Jakarta’s commitment to the 
problems in Papua (Timmer 2005: 454-455).
One of the effects of the above-mentioned 
differences between the Sorong-Ayamaru elite 
which is often suspected of conspiring to control 
Papua as ‘SOS’ (Semua Orang Sorong – ‘all-
Sorong’) and ‘disadvantaged’ highland tribes and 
‘backward’ south coastal plains peoples, was the 
significant local support for the establishment of 
a separate province of Central Irian Jaya in the 
Timika area. This new province was advocated by 
the head of the district of Timika, Clemens Tinal, 
and the head of the Timika legislative council, 
Andreas Anggaibak. As Anggaibak said himself, 
he was encouraged by BIN to go ahead with the 
establishment of the new province (Chauvel 
and Bhakti 2004: 41). In the region he enjoyed 
support from a group called ‘Group of Seven 
Tribes’. When Anggaibak announced the official 
establishment of the province in late August 
2003, riots broke out during which five people 
were killed and dozens were injured. Anggaibak’s 
alliance met with opposition from a youth group 
of the Amungme people led by Thomas Uamang, 
Yopie Kilangin and Yohanes Deikme, with the 
support of the Amungme and other ethnic 
groups around Timika. This regional conflict 
about pemekaran is an extension of older disputes 
between the communities close to PT Freeport 
Indonesia copper and gold mining operations 
that relate to the misuse of company funds and 
collaboration of community leaders with the TNI 
in the region (Leith 2003; Ballard 2002; Widjojo 
2003).16 Exposing tensions between highland and 
north coastal people, and in an attempt to gain a 
share of the riches of the Freeport mining venture, 
elements of the elite in Biak argued that Biak 
would be a better location for the new province’s 
capital in April and May 2004. They proposed 
that Admiral Henk Wabiser should be appointed 
as acting Governor (Chauvel 2005: 77).
Tensions at the regional level also played 
a role in the establishment of West Irian Jaya. 
New districts in West Irian Jaya like Fak-fak and 
Raja Ampat (which is rich in forest and nickel 
resources) felt uncomfortable with what they 
feared as domination by those from the Sorong 
and Ayamaru regions and opted to remain within 
the Province of Papua. Furthermore, during 
Atururi’s lobbying for the establishment of West 
Irian Jaya, customary leaders in the region had an 
interest in the division plans, as it would lead to 
the establishment of twenty-eight new regencies, 
including Teluk Bintuni, which would offer them 
an opportunity to occupy new administrative 
positions. The importance attached to the 
creation of the Teluk Bintuni regency is related to 
the above-mentioned operations of the Tangguh 
plant in the Bintuni Bay. The new regency, and 
the new province of West Irian Jaya of which 
it is part, will be abundantly rich in natural 
resources. 
The pemekaran decree amplified cleavages 
within the Papuan elite, one group of which 
favours Otsus as a means for the development of 
Papua as a whole and is lead by Governor Solossa, 
who is supported by a number of civil society 
organisations and prominent Papuan intellectuals. 
Others were keen to establish their own provinces 
and districts to claim their own power positions 
and secure access to natural resources. Ethnic 
tensions along regional fault lines intensified as 
the pro-pemekaran players in Papua demanded 
a share of the fiscal transfers from the central 
government and wanted to increase control over 
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the territory’s riches. The resulting disunity among 
influential people in the Papuan bureaucratic elite 
weakened the support for Otsus and eased the 
implementation of the pemekaran law (McGibbon 
2004: 61). 
AUTONOMY AND ITS 
OPPORTUNITIES
Within the plans for the establishment of new 
districts and new provinces, almost no provision 
has been made to ensure that new government 
policies are adjusted to local circumstances and 
meet the aspirations of the people. The majority 
of government officials are accustomed to working 
with top-down programs and accountability 
procedures that rarely involve the communities 
who figure as subjects in the plans and reports. 
The New Order government with its ambition 
to impose a layer of ‘Indonesianness’ all over the 
archipelago propagated the idea that the lives 
of citizens in such remote and ‘underdeveloped’ 
regions as Papua had to be transformed according 
to fixed formats. The results are often unsettling, 
in particular when long-standing community-
based ways of doing things and local ways of 
resource management are disrupted. While 
development plans for Papua were designed 
to improve the living conditions of so-called 
‘isolated people’ (masyarakat terasing) they often 
lead to estrangement. This, in turn, stimulated 
a tendency to reflect nostalgically on one’s own 
unique non-state units such as the kinship group 
and the ‘customary people’ (masyarakat adat) 
– whose rights should be restored.
Currently, decentralised governments at the 
district levels face the daunting task of finding 
ways to overcome deep-seated feelings of distrust 
towards the state, and to develop programs that 
acknowledge the complex varieties and recent 
changes in Papuan society. Newly recruited 
personnel are for the most part educated at 
schools for public administration with curricula 
that accord with the New Order and its top-down 
philosophy. As such, they are ill equipped to 
adjust themselves to new democratic and open-
minded ways of governance. 
Reflecting on the colonial context in the 
Australian-administered Territory of Papua and 
New Guinea in the 1960s, Lawrence (1969) 
argues that the difficulty of establishing a Western 
type of legal system is that the groups concerned, 
that is, the Australians and the New Guineans, 
represent quite different, specialized social 
systems. Both systems had their own idiosyncratic 
processes of social control that were not expected 
to function in a single legal framework. Today, 
the Papua New Guinea government still faces 
the difficult challenge of binding a variety of 
distinct communities into an effective political 
and ideological organisation (LiPuma 1995; 
Douglas 2000; May 2001 and 2003). The present 
situation in Papua appears to suffer from a similar 
incompatibility between models of governance 
structured upon institutional principles of modern 
statehood and a variety of everyday political and 
social realities. Otsus aims to counter this, but 
the formidable challenge facing decentralising 
governments is beyond most administrators’ 
imaginations and was not anticipated by the 
legislative or executive bodies that enacted and 
implemented the pemekaran law.
Previously, the political and governmental 
situation in Papua was characterized as based 
on an ‘outside’ and ‘Indonesian’ government 
ruling a majority of Papuans through models of 
governance current in Java and not embracing or 
fully appreciating ‘Papuan ways of doing things’. 
While there were a fair number of Papuans in the 
bureaucracy at all levels, and a few Governors in 
the period from 1963 were ethnically Papuan, 
local communities saw the regional and provincial 
government as dominated by Javanese. As more 
Papuans began to occupy seats in the formal 
sector, ideas about the government changed to 
a sense of domination of ‘Indonesian politics’ 
endorsed by Papuan elites.
Many criticise provincial leaders because they 
promise local communities development and 
access to resources while they actually profit from 
arrangements with elites in Jakarta, TNI and 
Javanese and foreign investors. This obviously 
leads to an unstable situation as political support 
at the local level will soon dwindle and break 
along regional or ethnic fault lines. Since 
administrative procedures lack transparency, the 
widespread feeling among Papuans that their own 
elite cannot be trusted will no doubt increase. 
Significantly, many in Papua believed that 
national democratic elections would bring 
the solutions deemed necessary. Presidential 
elections in September 2004 were a victory for 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly know as 
SBY) who defeated Megawati Sukarnoputri on 
charisma, a purported no-nonsense approach 
to reversing the stagnating reform and growing 
corruption, and the promise to peacefully resolve 
the tensions in Papua and Aceh. In Papua, the 
elections proceeded without major disturbances 
and voter turn-out was high. One of the main 
reasons for the widespread participation in the 
elections was disillusionment with President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri’s lack of commitment 
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to Papua. Since SBY advocated support for 
Otsus and promised to foster democracy, many 
considered a future under him more promising. 
The elections in Papua clearly demonstrated the 
general will to support a civilian-led government 
and the rule of democracy in Indonesia (Timmer 
2005: 448-450). 
Most Papuans want to become modern 
Indonesians and find democratic solutions for 
the problems they are facing. There is, however, 
a tension between those who seek, find and use 
opportunities offered in the formal and commercial 
sectors and those who are denied such prospects. 
Papuan communities’ responses to a corrupt 
administration and dishonest behaviour of their 
own elite are varied. In many of the locations 
where large-scale resource extraction takes place, 
such as Freeport mining in the Mimika region and 
the Tangguh project in the Bintuni Bay, as well as 
logging and fishery businesses, local communities 
organise themselves against neighbouring groups 
and their elites who also claim natural resources 
and compensation. 
One effect of this development is the 
emergence of eccentric and charged revitalizations 
of customary structures and the establishment of 
customary organisations (masyarakat adat). The 
expectations of monetary flows that resource 
development projects might bring, and the 
related competing claims over land and resources, 
pose problems for local people who no longer 
know whom to trust and through whom to raise 
their voices with outside companies and the 
government. At the same time, the government 
and the companies find it increasingly difficult 
to deal effectively with the dispersed forms of 
Papuan leadership.
On top of the resulting frustrations and 
tensions between groups and a growing gap 
between local communities and the formal sector, 
criminal and predatory business is increasingly 
entrenching itself in the instruments of the 
state. The ways in which this also affects local 
sentiments and discourses on identity, autonomy 
and independence, and leads to new regional and 
ethnic alliances, may show parallels to situations 
in African countries as described by Bayart, Ellis 
and Hibou (1999), among others. However, as 
Fraenkel (2004) points out, comparisons between 
governance in the African and Pacific (and 
Asian) regions may prove to be very useful but 
should be done cautiously. A careful comparison 
between Papua and Africa is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but let me make the point that the 
most obvious parallel between Papua and certain 
regions in Africa is, as said, the criminalization of 
the state in Papua. In the capacity of provincial 
legislator, district head, head of a department 
and so on, individuals not only gain influence 
over state resources but they also enjoy relative 
freedom to make profitable deals with resources 
extraction ventures. These businesses engage in 
the largely unregulated exploitation of minerals, 
oil, fish, and forest resources.
A striking example is rampant logging and 
the illegal trade of merbau (kayu besi) that is 
threatening the pristine forests of the region. 
(EIA/Telapak 2005; Down to Earth 2002). 
Merbau is a luxurious dark hardwood that is the 
main target of a billion-dollar trade route from 
Papua to the booming cities of China’s Yangtze 
River delta. Another unsettling example is the 
involvement of the TNI and government officials 
in the gathering and trade of gaharu (eaglewood) 
that is sold for high prices to the Arab world 
(SKP Merauke 2004).17 One of the results is that 
wealth is taken away from the bottom up while 
opportunities for advancement are redistributed 
inside and outside Papua within limited elites by 
the provision of gifts, commercial opportunities, 
and so on. Politically and economically, Papua 
begins to show signs of the privatisation of the 
state and the criminalization of the behaviour of 
power-holders. 
CONCLUSION
The post-Suharto reformasi period in Papua 
was marked by revivals of optimism about 
change and expectations of imminent far-
reaching sovereignty. The prospect of justice, 
the acknowledgement of the ‘true history of 
Papua’, and increased respect for the Papuans, 
alternated with strong disappointment and 
mounting resentment towards ‘Jakarta’ due 
to renewed harsh and poorly controlled TNI 
operations. Amid a persistent undercurrent of 
distrust towards the national government many 
in Papua showed a remarkable ardour for entering 
into a bargaining process (albeit often with high 
opening bids, alarming policy makers in Jakarta). 
Hopes of justice being done to the Papuans were 
again visible during the recent national elections 
in which the people of Papua went to the polls 
in high numbers. Also, the Otsus and pemekaran 
supported lobbies indicate that many in Papua 
want to participate actively in a political economy 
of dependence on and engagement with Jakarta.
Dependence is constructed and maintained 
as much by Papuans who support a dialogue 
with ‘Jakarta’ and are eager to cast votes during 
democratic elections, as by political actors who 
try to convince Jakarta of the need to recognise 
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the grievances of the people of Papua, or merely 
seek to profit financially from this relationship. 
On the other hand, both the ‘indigenous Papuans’ 
and those generally labelled as ‘immigrants’ – the 
divisions between the two can never be clear, let 
alone desirable – have for a number of reasons 
quite a strong urge to live their lives largely 
autonomously. This is due to their memoria 
passionis and disappointment about the central 
government’s policies towards Papua. When the 
need to distance oneself from unreliable elites 
and decentralisation goes astray, people begin to 
revitalise traditions of relative freedom allegedly 
enjoyed in the past. 
At the level of local communities, throughout 
history, people have been subject to forms of 
destabilisation as a result of interactions with 
others and they continuously developed new 
strategies with locally specific inventiveness. 
This offers proof that Papua, so often said to be 
governed by age-old traditions, is in fact a place 
of inexorable social and cultural change. The 
historical conditions underlying these processes 
are centuries-old trade, family and religious links 
between West New Guinea and the Moluccas 
and particular exchanges in knowledge and goods 
between groups in the highlands. Papuan peoples’ 
potent histories of relative autonomy and their 
recent experiences with the church, the colonial 
government and Indonesian institutions are 
extremely diverse. Generally, local institutions 
have been internally negotiated in response to 
the administration and the church. At the same 
time, from the district level up to the provincial 
bureaucracy and the national parliament, Papuan 
leaders and politicians increasingly usurp the 
powers of the civil service. Less promising is 
that the district and provincial levels of the 
administration, in particular, have become 
intertwined in personal patronage systems.
The voices for more autonomy in Papua are 
generally not about Papuan nationalism but are 
cast in opposition to the dominance of the state. 
The state has not brought what Papuans expected 
and is thus challenged by social, ethnic, religious 
and regional identities. Most Papuans treat the 
state with a high degree of suspicion. Only when 
the promise of commitment to and respect for 
their demands and aspirations is in the air, do 
they want to engage with the state. Currently, 
there are two points of contention among the 
vast majority of people in Papua. One is that the 
unpredictability of ‘Jakarta’ as the model of the 
state that the central government is propagating 
to Papua is unclear, and the other is frustration 
over the wealth and influence of Papuan elites 
whose agendas are often too detached from the 
circumstances they claim to address.
To remain critical of what is going on in Papua, 
policy makers (as well as Papua watchers) should 
be careful not to fall into the classical mistake of 
seeing that there is a united Papuan cause that 
is frustrated by ‘Indonesia’. In fact, there has 
never been an en masse Papuan effort to struggle 
for secession from Indonesia or a ‘compact, 
self-conscious, and organized community’ as 
Chauvel (2005: 3), among others, observes. 
There have always been strong divisions within 
Papua even when people organise in civil society 
organisations, government bodies, or alongside 
activist circles abroad. What most Papuans have 
in common though is a memoria passionis and 
the experiences of development programs and 
democratisation efforts dogged by unfulfilled 
promises and failures. During the Papuan Spring 
this shared history was expressed Papua-wide 
in terms of a demand for the straightening of 
Papuan history and enhanced respect for the 
Papuans. But the attempts of organising people 
into a united front were undermined by military 
operations and the pemekaran decree that was 
supported by elements of the Papuan elite. 
What remained was Otsus; but this promising 
reform policy was frustrated by Papuan and 
Jakarta politics surrounding the pemekaran decree 
which brought to the surface a spate of old and 
enduring regional, political and personal tensions 
in the region. The pemekaran plan provided 
opportunities for disenchanted Papuan leaders 
and subsequently unleashed regional and ethnic 
sentiments as well as mutual distrust among 
Papuan leaders.
Finally, with respect to the increasing 
prominence of the informal economy in Papua, it 
is important to realise that since the New Order 
period, major parts of domestic Papua operated 
more as an unofficial or ‘unconventional’ 
economy than an economy of wage earners, 
formal institutions, and legal contracts. While it 
is true that a formidable number of people earn 
government wages, most rural people trade and 
exchange goods in and between communities 
in order to survive. Erring decentralisation and 
the limited presence of meaningful development 
programs trigger fractionalisation when people 
begin to compete for political and economic 
resources. Self-interest in this context is the result 
of a realistic view that relates to current and past 
development promises. People know that outsiders 
come and make promises about financial rewards, 
roads, bridges, sago factories, logging activities, 
fish factories and so on, which are unlikely to be 
sustainable. In these circumstances, elites and 
local people have a realistic view to get what they 
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can while they can. Hence what is often seen as 
greediness is a response to the ongoing deferral 
of development alongside failing policies that 
aim to enhance services to the people of Papua. 
In a region that is abundantly rich in natural 
resources, whose people do not share equally in 
the profits of resource development projects, and 
where many people’s dignities have been denied 
in violent ways for a long period of time, this kind 
of response is understandable. In other words, 
‘disorder’ in Papua is not merely a condition 
created by ‘Jakarta’ or as a state of dereliction; it 
is a condition that offers opportunities for people 
in Papua who know how to play the system.
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ENDNOTES
1  See Soekarno (2000).
2  See Pepera (1972: 82-83) and Vlasblom (2004: 
479). For an account of the Pepera based on archival 
materials and concluding that it was a sham, see 
Saltford (2000).
3  A reconstruction of the origin and development 
of the OPM can be found in Vlasblom (2004: 469, 
chapters 9, 10 and 11). Less thoroughly researched 
is the Indonesian-language account by Djopari 
(1993).
4  Since the Indonesian government began to stimulate 
economic development in the region, an older Dutch 
colonial programme of population distribution 
from highly populated regions such as Java and 
Bali to Papua and other less populated regions was 
continued. Among policy makers, this so-called 
transmigrasi (‘transmigration’) was seen as a way to 
boost the development of Papua, but the programme 
proved to be largely unsuccessful (see Pouwer 1999: 
173-174).
5  See van den Broek and Szalay (2001) for an overview 
of the turbulent events in Papua from 1999 to 2000. 
6  See Hernawan and Van den Broek (1999). The 
concept of ‘memoria passionis’ was introduced into 
Papua by the Ofﬁce for Justice & Peace (Sekretariat 
Keadilan dan Perdamaian) of the Catholic Diocese 
of Jayapura and is also the title of a series of annual 
reports on the social and political situation in Papua 
(see www.hampapua.org). 
7  See Sumule (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) for overviews of 
the establishment of the team, the production of the 
bill, the amendments, and its passing through the 
People’s Consultative Assembly in Jakarta.
8  In fact, the pemekaran model was devised in the early 
1980s by then Irian Jaya Governor Busiri Suryowinoto 
and Minister of Home Affairs Supardjo Rustam. The 
idea was to Papuanise the bureaucracy, beginning 
at the district level, and create six provincial levels 
based on the administrative areas demarcated by the 
colonial Dutch government (ICG 2003: 2). The 
plan was shelved largely because there were not 
enough qualiﬁed locals to ﬁll the required positions. 
In 1999, the division of the province was proposed 
again by the transitional government of President 
Habibie as a way to speed up the pemekaran of the 
province. However, the law was suspended after 
sweeping resistance in Papua, where the provincial 
government and a majority of the people feared that 
it would spread discord among the people of Papua.
9  To illustrate his position in the Papua conﬂict, 
Jimmy Ijie wrote a preface to an IJCC publication 
of the Indonesian translation of an essay written by 
the Russian Gavriil Kesselbrenner in 1961 about 
the international politics surrounding the status of 
West New Guinea. In his preface, Ijie stresses that 
Kesselbrenner’s analysis highlights that Irian Jaya 
is a rightful part of Indonesia. He also stresses that 
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there is a danger of the internationalisation of the 
conﬂict in Papua, then and now, because it so easily 
provokes people to make a stand against Indonesia 
(Ijie 2003).
10 Muridan Widjojo, personal communication, 7 May 
2005.
11 See for example, Budiardjo and Sioe Long (1983), 
Osborne (1985), Sharp with Kaisiëpo (1994), Walsh 
and Rouch (1999), Barr (2002), Martinkus (2002), 
King (2004), and contributions to a special edition 
on Papua of the New Internationalist (Volume 344, 
April 2002). By and large, these works follow one 
basic line of argument which suggests that Papua 
will or should become a second East Timor and that 
Papuans are the victims of genocide or deliberate, 
well-organised terror, obscuring the fact that Papuans 
are (and have always been) divided. Some of these 
analyses also exaggerate the number of victims 
of military operations in the region. The growing 
amount of writings by people from the region include 
Kholifan (1999) on the histories of the OPM and 
the TNI, Giay (2000) on the need for emancipation 
of Papuans, Yoman (2000) on the international and 
Indonesian verdicts on West New Guinea, and Pigay 
(2000) presenting an overview of the dynamics of 
Papuan nationalism. 
12 One of the reasons for this lack of attention to the 
cultural and social realities of Papuans is that since 
its incorporation in Indonesia access to the region 
for researchers has been severely restricted.
13 See Chauvel (2005), Ellen (2003), Huizinga (1998), 
Kamma (1947/1948, 1948/1949), Swadling (1996), 
Timmer (2000b), and Visser (1989).
14 Don Flassy, personal communication, 23 April 
2005.
15 In the statistics for social welfare produced by the 
Provincial Statistical Agency in 2002, the districts of 
Jayawijaya, Paniai and Puncak Jaya show the highest 
number of poor families and the greatest amount 
of so-called ‘isolated communities’ (masyarakat 
tertinggal) (BPS Papua 2002: 207). The 2004 National 
Human Development Report shows that the average 
human development index (HDI) for Indonesia in 
2002 is 66, ranging from 76 in the highly urbanised 
and industrialised region of East Jakarta to 47 in the 
district of Jayawijaya in Papua (NHDR 2004: 1). See 
Timmer (forthcoming) for an evaluation of these 
statistics.
16 Anggaibak, who is a former policeman, tried to 
control the so-called One Percent Fund that was 
set up in 1996 by the Freeport mining company to 
support social development programs, which met 
with opposition from other political players in the 
region.
17 The rampant spread of the HIV/AIDS-virus is partly 
connected to the prostitution centres established 
and run by the TNI to service local and migrant 
workers. These prostitution centres are a principal 
source of the infection. Estimates suggest that the 
number of HIV-infected people in Papua stands at 
approximately 15,000 at present.
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